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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die Frage nach der Wahl der optimalen Eigentu¨merstruktur eines Unter-
nehmens bescha¨ftigt Wissenschaft und Praxis schon seit Jahrzehnten. Ins-
besondere die Trennung von
”
ownership“ und
”
control“ und die dadurch
mo¨glicherweise entstehenden Interessenskonﬂikte zwischen den Eigentu¨mern
eines Unternehmens, die i.d.R. nur generelle strategische Leitlinien ausgeben,
und dem Management, das tagesaktuelle Entscheidungen (ohne Ru¨cksprache
mit den Eigentu¨mern) triﬀt, standen und stehen im Mittelpunkt des Interes-
ses. Der Versicherungsmarkt mit seinen darin ta¨tigen Unternehmen stellt da-
bei ein besonders gutes Untersuchungsobjekt fu¨r verschiedene Theorien dar,
da neben Versicherungsaktiengesellschaften (VAG) in den meisten La¨ndern
auch noch genossenschaftlich organisierte Versicherungsvereine auf Gegen-
seitigkeit (VVaG) agieren. Insofern fokussieren internationale Studien zu
Principal-Agent-Konﬂikten ha¨uﬁg auf dem Gegensatz zwischen
”
stock owner-
ship und
”
mutual ownership in der Versicherungsindustrie. Der deutsche Ver-
sicherungsmarkt allerdings kann diesbezu¨glich als ein Speziﬁkum betrachtet
werden, da hier eine dritte Form von Eigentu¨merstruktur existiert, na¨mlich
die der o¨ﬀentlich-rechtlichen Versicherungsunternehmen (O¨RV).
Diese Dreiteilung des Marktes ermo¨glicht eine erweiterte Analyse der tra-
ditionellen Hypothesen zu unterschiedlichen Eigentu¨merstrukturen und den
damit verbundenen Principal-Agent-Problemen. In einem weiteren Schritt
bearbeitet diese Studie nicht nur die Interessenskonﬂikte, welche sich aus der
Eigentu¨merstruktur des Versicherungsunternehmens ergeben, sondern analy-
siert auch den Einﬂuss der Eigentu¨merstruktur der Holdinggesellschaft (falls
vorhanden). Um diesbezu¨gliche Aussagen zu machen, wurde die Gruppen-
zugeho¨rigkeit aufgrund der Eigentu¨merstruktur der ho¨chsten Gruppenebene
zugeteilt.
Im Folgenden wurden auch Mischformen, d.h. beispielsweise eine Aktien-
gesellschaft, deren Mutter auch eine Aktiengesellschaft ist, mit Mischformen
(Unternehmen ist eine VVaG, Mutter eine VAG) verglichen und erstmals
untersucht, ob Mischformen Einﬂuss auf die Eﬃzienz eines Lebensversiche-
rungsunternehmens haben.
Williamson (1963) formulierte als erster die
”
expense preference hypothe-
sis“, die besagt, dass AGs hinsichtlich ihrer Kostenstruktur eﬃzienter sind
als andere Formen von Eigentum, da Aktiona¨re (z.B. im Gegensatz zu Mit-
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gliedern einer Genossenschaft) sta¨rkere Kontrollrechte gegenu¨ber dem Ma-
nagement besitzen. Fama & Jensen (1983) nennen den komparativen Vorteil
als eine Erkla¨rungsmo¨glichkeit dafu¨r, dass in manchen Industriezweigen, wie
eben der Versicherungsbranche, seit langer Zeit mehrere Formen von Eigen-
tum gleichzeitig existieren und miteinander konkurrieren. Da jede dieser Ei-
gentumsformen oﬀenbar auf einer eigenen
”
production frontier“ agiere, gebe
es keine generelle Dominanz einer Gruppe u¨ber die anderen, so dass auch
keine Verdra¨ngung stattﬁnde: die
”
eﬃcient structure hypothesis“.
Die vorliegende Arbeit bescha¨ftigt sich hauptsa¨chlich mit diesen zwei Hy-
pothesen im Zusammenhang mit der Eﬃzienz unterschiedlicher Eigentums-
formen in einem Markt. Diese Hypothesen wurden fu¨r die drei auf dem deut-
schen Lebensversicherungsmarkt ta¨tigen Eigentu¨merstrukturen VAG, VVaG
und O¨RV u¨berpru¨ft. Basierend auf einem Datensatz, der ca. 90% des Marktes
fu¨r einen Zeitraum von 2002 bis 2005 abdeckt, konnte nachgewiesen werden,
dass im deutschen Lebensversicherungsmarkt Marktsegmentierung vorliegt,
dass also VAGs, VVaGs und O¨RVs sowohl unterschiedliche Produktionstech-
nologien verwenden als auch gruppenspeziﬁsche Kostenstrukturen aufweisen.
Des Weiteren zeigte sich, dass die
”
eﬃcient structure hypothesis“ zumindest
fu¨r O¨RVs verworfen werden kann, da diese, trotz der Existenz von gruppen-
speziﬁschen Technologien, die fu¨r sie typischen Input-Output-Kombinationen
weniger eﬃzient als die beiden anderen Gruppen herstellen. VAGs dagegen
sind bei der Produktion speziﬁscher Outputs den beiden anderen Gruppen
u¨berlegen; VVaGs dominieren zumindest die Gruppe der O¨RVs und sind
bei den ihnen eigenen Input-Output-Kombinationen nicht weniger eﬃzient
als VAGs. Die
”
expense preference hypothesis“ fand schließlich in der vor-
liegenden Arbeit Besta¨tigung. Die Gruppe der VAGs
”
proﬁtiert“ oﬀenbar
tatsa¨chlich von den besseren Kontrollmo¨glichkeiten durch die Eigentu¨mer
und weist eine eﬃzientere Kostenstruktur auf als genossenschaftlich organi-
sierte oder o¨ﬀentliche VUs.
Weiterhin wurden Unterschiede in der Eﬃzienz innerhalb der einzel-
nen Eigentumsformen untersucht. Dabei zeigte sich, dass manche o¨ﬀentlich
zuga¨ngliche Firmenkennzahlen einen signiﬁkanten Zusammenhang zum Eﬃ-
zienzgrad eines VU aufweisen. So haben VUs mit hoher technischer Eﬃzi-
enz ebenfalls einen hohen RoA, geringe Abschlusskosten und eine niedrige
Stornoquote. Das selbe gilt auch fu¨r kosteneﬃziente Firmen, die allerdings
anstelle geringer Abschlusskosten eine niedrige Verwaltungskostenquote aus-
weisen. Vor allem die Ergebnisse bezu¨glich O¨RVs, die gegenu¨ber VUs in
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Privateigentum Eﬃzienznachteile zu haben scheinen, stehen in der Tradi-
tion der Theorie zu o¨ﬀentlichem Eigentum. Dass diese Unternehmensform
am deutschen Versicherungsmarkt jedoch schon seit Jahrhunderten existiert
und bislang von privatwirtschaftlichen VUs nicht verdra¨ngt werden konnte,
steht jedoch im Widerspruch zur Theorie eﬃzienter Ma¨rkte. Allerdings gilt
insbesondere fu¨r die Resultate hinsichtlich der Gruppe der O¨RVs zu beach-
ten, dass die Aussagen der vorliegenden Arbeit insofern limitiert sind, als
ein
”
4-Input/2-Output“-Modell Verwendung ﬁndet. Gerade aber O¨RVs neh-
men fu¨r sich in Anspruch, auch andere Leistungen zu erbringen, die oftmals
im Widerspruch zum gewinnmaximierenden Verhalten privater VUs stehen,
aber trotzdem dem Gemeinwohl zugute kommen (z.B. die Schaﬀung von Ar-
beitspla¨tzen, gerade in wirtschaftlich weniger entwickelten Regionen oder die
Fo¨rderung von Wissenschaft, Kunst und Sport). Diese Formen von Outputs
sind qualitativer Natur, entsprechend ﬁnden sie in der vorliegenden quanti-
tativ ausgerichteten Untersuchung keine Beru¨cksichtigung.
Die im deutschen Versicherungsmarkt vorhandene Form der O¨RVs, die
einerseits, anders als die meisten o¨ﬀentlichen Unternehmen, in anderen Sek-
toren keine Monopolstellung inne haben, sondern mit privatwirtschaftlich ori-
entierten, gewinnmaximierenden VUs konkurrieren mu¨ssen, andererseits aber
durch den Einﬂuss des o¨ﬀentlichen Eigentu¨mers Aktivita¨ten setzen und Leis-
tungen erbringen, die zwar wohlfahrtsstiftend sein mo¨gen, aber wohl kaum
die Eﬃzienz erho¨hen, wird durch die traditionelle
”
eﬃcient structure hy-
pothesis“ nicht erfasst. Die Erga¨nzung einer Eﬃzienzanalyse des deutschen
Versicherungsmarktes um den
”
sozialen Output“ von VUs, insbesondere von
O¨RVs, bleibt somit ku¨nftigen Untersuchungen vorbehalten.
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Abstract
This thesis provides new insights into the eﬀect of ownership on eﬃciency
by analyzing the German life insurance market over the period 2002-2005.
Previous research on alternative organizational forms in the life insurance in-
dustry has focused on stock and mutual ownership only. Due to the unique-
ness of the German insurance market, where privately owned companies face
competition by public insurers, we add to the literature on the well-known
debate on public vs. private ownership on investigating stock, mutual and
public ownership structures. The thesis calculates the technical, cost and al-
locative eﬃciency scores in order to test the eﬃcient structure hypothesis as
well as the expense preference hypothesis. The underlying method is tradi-
tional DEA as well as the recently introduced SW-bootstrapping method to
correct for the bias of DEA estimators. The results give strong support to the
expense preference hypothesis. No evidence is found that public ownership
is an eﬃcient corporate structure for life insurers. Thus, stock ownership is
superior to mutual and public structures, with smaller stock insurers being
even more dominant in production technology. Half of the German stock in-
surers are owned by mutual or public holding companies. The present work
identiﬁes the superstructure of stock insurers in order to test for any impact
of the organizational form of a holding company on the eﬃciency of its diﬀer-
ently organized subsidiaries. The ﬁndings suggest that uniformly organized
groups of companies dominate hybrid forms and that the diﬀerence in orga-
nizational forms between a holding company and its subsidiary may lead to
frictions which will cause ineﬃciencies.
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Ownership and Eﬃciency in the German Life
Insurance Market: A DEA Bootstrap
Approach
1 Introduction
The structure of corporate ownership in the insurance industry and its im-
plications for managerial control have been subject to academic debate since
the late 1970s (see Fama & Jensen (1983), Finsinger (1983) or Demsetz &
Lehn (1985)). In particular, the dichotomy of organizational structure has
attracted much attention. Beside stock companies which employ the stan-
dard corporate form, the so called mutual ownership, where consumers are
at the same time the sole owners of the ﬁrm that produces the good to be
consumed by the consumer owners, is quite unique in our well-established
economic systems.
The German insurance market can be considered of great interest be-
cause of the existence of a third ownership structure. After basic forms of
private cooperatives for ﬁre insurance had emerged in the early 18th century,
the German principalities nationalized those activities to create monopoly
ﬁre insurance. In the late 19th century, these public insurance companies
extended their activities to other lines of insurance, such as property and
life insurance, where they had to compete with private insurance compa-
nies already in existence at the time (like Anglo-American stock insurers or
domestic mutual insurers).
Today public insurance companies still participate in the competitive life
insurance market, with the sole owner and responsible body being a local
authority (mostly a federal state in alliance with some municipal savings
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banks). As a result of their origin, public insurers still restrict their activ-
ities to the historical administrative region where they were founded (the
boundaries of a principality perished long ago) to eliminate potential compe-
tition with other public insurers. In contrast to publicly owned companies in
other branches, companies organized in this third form of ownership do not
aim to make proﬁts (to decrease the public budget deﬁcit) but act on a non-
proﬁt basis for the beneﬁt of its policyholders, similar to mutual insurers.
Moreover, public insurance companies assign themselves (or are assigned by
their owners) an important role in local employment opportunities and in the
promotion of arts, sciences, sports and other social activities. Finally, a pub-
lic owner is assumed to have more power to control managerial decisions and
compensation than a general meeting of a mutual insurance company. On
the other hand, critics of the system of public enterprises often argue that,
in companies under public law, decisions may be made on political grounds
instead of economic ones which could lead to ineﬃcient managerial actions
required (or at least approved) by a public owner.
We add to the existing literature on organizational structure in the life
insurance industry in manifold ways: ﬁrstly, by studying the German mar-
ket, while most prior studies on organizational forms in the life insurance
industry have focused on the United States; secondly, by updating results
of the few existing studies that dealt with the German market; thirdly, by
combining the approaches of previous studies which either dealt with private
vs. public ownership or (especially in the insurance industry) with stock vs.
mutual structure by investigating diﬀerences between these three forms of
ownership structure; then, we use recently introduced bootstrapping tech-
niques to obtain statistical inference in our non-parametric approach, in try-
ing to quantify agency costs which arise from the diﬀerent forms of ownership
and the resulting conﬂicts of interest of life insurance companies. We use
the widespread method of Data Envelopment Analysis (ﬁrst introduced by
Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes (1978)) to measure the eﬃciency of almost all
German life insurers from 2002 to 2005. Moreover, we use the bootstrapping
method to correct for the bias of DEA eﬃciency estimators as proposed by
Simar & Wilson (1998) and Simar & Wilson (2000).
Furthermore, we present an analysis of the holding structure hypothesis,
which says that the corporate structure of a holding company has an inﬂu-
ence on the eﬃciency of its respective subsidiaries. We test this hypothesis in
three steps. First, we identify the companies according to the ownership of
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the highest level of the corporate structure, second, we make a deeper anal-
ysis of stock insurers (the only form of ownership that can have a holding
structure with another ownership structure). Third, we compare pure owner-
ship structure (e.g. stock ﬁrm with stock holding) to hybrid forms (e.g. stock
ﬁrm with mutual holding).
A large number of German stock insurers is actually owned by a mutual
holding company or a public entity. We assume that a stock insurer owned
by a mutual holding company (mutual stock insurer, henceforth) and a stock
insurer owned by a public holding company (public stock insurer, henceforth)
tend to act like a mutual insurer and a public insurer, respectively. These
hybrid forms of ownership lack the typical properties of a stock company.
Mutual stock insurers are not able to use any of the control mechanisms
of stock companies named before, since the sole owner is a mutual body.
Public stock insurers may face the same uneconomic decisions by political
representatives of their public owner as “pure” public companies do.
The thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
existing literature. Section 3 formulates our hypotheses and outlines the
methodology used in this thesis. Section 4 describes the data set used and
summarizes the descriptive statistics of German life insurance companies.
Section 5 presents the results of the data envelopment analysis at the ﬁrm
level. Section 6 describes the estimation results at the holding level, sec-
tion 7 provides a deeper insight into stock insurers with a diﬀerently orga-
nized holding structure, and ﬁnally, section 8 summarizes the results of the
Logit regression analysis with eﬃciency as the dependent variable explained
by insurance companies characteristics. Section 9 gives a summary of our
ﬁndings.
In Appendix A, results of the Malmquist Index, which is an estimation of
eﬃciency improvement over time for the observed time period, is presented,
and in Appendix B, results of the bootstrapping are illustrated.
2 Related Literature
This section gives a brief overview of previous research on diﬀerent forms
of ownership. The theoretical fundamentals of the separation of ownership
and control and its consequences are laid in Berle & Means (1932) and later
in Coase (1960) who was the ﬁrst to introduce the problem of separation of
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ownership and control and the resulting concept of agency costs. He argues
that diﬀerent forms of ownership face diﬀerent conﬂicts of interest which in
turn results in diﬀerent levels of agency costs. Williamson (1963) was the ﬁrst
to formulate one of the main hypotheses in the corporate structure debate,
the so called expense preference hypothesis, which states that stock ﬁrms are
most eﬃcient concerning their cost structure because they deal better with
manager/owner conﬂicts. Fama & Jensen (1983) suggest that the coexistence
of two diﬀerent ownership structures in the industry over a long period of
time could be explained by comparative advantage. Since both types operate
on their respective production frontiers (and not on a common one), neither
shows overall predominance to expel companies of the competing structure
from the industry. Mayers & Smith (1994) strengthen the theoretical argu-
ments of Fama & Jensen (1983) and ﬁnd that diﬀerent ownership structures
are more concentrated in diﬀerent lines of business. They conclude that
each organization form has its own advantage and formulate the eﬃciency
structure hypothesis.
The most recent theoretical papers dealing with the German insurance
market are Breuer & Breuer (2002) and Breuer & Breuer (2004). Breuer &
Breuer (2002) argue that federal authorities have taken regulatory actions
to decrease potential agency conﬂicts signiﬁcantly, so that no eﬃciency dif-
ferences between mutual and stock insurers should be observable. Breuer
& Breuer (2004) list various theoretical arguments for the predominance of
public insurance companies (compared to stock and mutual insurers): public
ﬁrms deal best with manager/owner conﬂicts because of their mechanism of
managerial control; furthermore, public ﬁrms work on a non-proﬁt basis and
therefore eliminate owner/policyholder conﬂicts; moreover, public insurers
have a competitive advantage because their respective owners assume (un-
limited) liability. The authors conclude that ceteris paribus public ownership
is the most eﬃcient corporate form in the insurance industry.
Empirical studies on ownership diﬀerences and their eﬀects on corporate
eﬃciency in the insurance industry are numerous, and their respective results
are not unambiguous. Some of the main ﬁndings are listed below.
Cummins, Weiss & Zi (1999) use Data Envelopment Analysis to analyze
a data set of almost 90% of property liability insurers in the USA from 1981-
1990. The authors introduce the concept of cross eﬃciency, i.e. measuring
the eﬃciency of stock insurers against the production frontier of mutual in-
surance companies and vice versa. Their results show evidence for the fact
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that mutual and stock insurers operating on diﬀerent production frontiers
use diﬀerent technologies (eﬃcient structure hypothesis). Moreover, since
their study indicates that stock insurers dominate mutual insurers even on
the mutual cost frontier, their ﬁndings give strong support to the expense
preference hypothesis. Lai & Limpaphayom (2003) analyze the Japanese
market by examining 26 ﬁrms in the period from 1983-1994 by pooled re-
gression analysis. The Japanese ﬁnancial market is quite unique due to the
existence of horizontal “Keiretsu” groups (i.e. interwoven ﬁnancial groups).
The authors analyze the ownership diﬀerences between stocks belonging to a
Keiretsu and independent stock and mutual insurers and ﬁnd that Keiretsu
ﬁrms show higher proﬁtability and higher loss ratios than their independent
counterparts. Furthermore, Japanese mutual insurers have higher levels of
free cash ﬂow, higher investment incomes and lower ﬁnancial leverage than
stock insurers have. Finally, the authors ﬁnd evidence for the eﬃcient struc-
ture hypothesis formulated in Mayers & Smith (1994). Cummins, Rubio-
Misas & Zi (2004) apply the same method of cross-frontier DEA as used in
the study of U.S. property/liability insurers by Cummins et al. (1999) to
analyze the Spanish insurance market from 1989-1997. Their results support
the eﬃcient structure hypothesis, but are generally not consistent with the
expense preference hypothesis. Green & Segal (2004) use a stochastic fron-
tier approach to test for eﬃciency of 136 ﬁrms in a data set consisting of 478
observations in the time period from 1995-1998. The authors are unable to
ﬁnd any diﬀerence in eﬃciency and proﬁtability between mutual and stock
owned ﬁrms. Nevertheless, their results suggest that cost eﬃciency in the life
insurance industry is substantially relative to earnings and that ineﬃciency
is negatively correlated with proﬁtability measures like, for instance, return
on equity.
The ﬁrst important eﬃciency analysis of the ownership structure of insur-
ance companies that deals with the German insurance market is published
by Finsinger (1983). Using OLS regressions the author analyzes 100 life in-
surance companies subdivided by their ownership form in the year 1980 and
ﬁnds that public insurers are able to give a competitive edge to policyhold-
ers with respect to surrender values as well as net returns from investing in
term life insurance policies. Furthermore, this author is the ﬁrst to look at
the form of ownership of life insurance subsidiaries as well as at the corpo-
rate structure of the respective holding companies. A recent study of the
German insurance industry were conducted Hussels & Ward (2006), Trigo
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Gamarra (2007) and Trigo Gamarra (2008). The eﬀects of liberalization on
the Austrian insurance market were analyzed by Mahlberg & Url (2003).
3 Hypotheses and Methodology
3.1 Hypotheses
Based on previous theoretical and empirical studies, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the three diﬀerent forms of ownership existing in the German life
insurance market have comparative advantages to deal with diﬀerent agency
conﬂicts, which results in diﬀerent agency costs (see Fama & Jensen (1983)
and Mayers & Smith (1994)).
As often argued, stock ownership deals better with owner/manager con-
ﬂict than mutual ownership: managers in a stock ﬁrm are confronted with
elaborate control mechanisms such as proxy ﬁghts, hostile takeovers, and
stock options as part of managerial compensation. These mechanisms can
reduce the incentives for managers to extract excessive values from the com-
pany and, as a result, from company owners and policyholders (see Coase
(1960) and Williamson (1963)). Control mechanisms for mutual ﬁrms seem
to be much weaker, such that managers are able to expropriate value from the
company resulting in higher operating expenses, as has always been argued
in literature (see e.g. O‘Hara (1981)). Although German mutual insurers
have a tripartite organizational structure similar to stock companies (man-
agement board, supervisory board and general meeting), the absence of large
institutional investors with a substantial number of shares in the company’s
stock can lead to unsystematic activities of policyholder owners in control-
ling managerial decisions. Since every policyholder only owns a small part
of the company (based on the portion of his/her personal insurance coverage
compared to the company’s overall amount of insurance), incentives to bear
the expenses for managerial control are quite small. Grossman & Hart (1980)
suggest that, in the absence of other control mechanisms such as takeover
bids, this free rider problem cannot be solved. Furthermore, the general
meeting of mutual policyholder owners often has no right to (re-)elect board
members or replace retired ones. Instead, the articles often assign to the
remaining board the power to co-opt a new member to the board (without
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approval of the general meeting). Thereby, the board is able to act indepen-
dently from the company owners whom they represent and act in collusion
with the management.
On the other end of the spectrum, there are public insurance companies.
Since public enterprises are owned by a single entity only, one expects higher
incentives to accept agency costs for controlling the management. On the
other hand, managerial replacement in a public ﬁrm could be long delayed
because of political inﬂuence. An unexpected change in management could
be the result of mismanagement in the past and could be utilized by polit-
ical opponents. Furthermore, whereas owners of stock insurers are usually
directly aﬀected by ineﬃcient management (e.g. through lower cash divi-
dends), the representatives of the owner of a public insurer normally do not
suﬀer from ﬁnancial penalties immediately.
The other important agency conﬂict is the policyholder/owner conﬂict as
owners and policyholders of stock insurers have diﬀerent interests. Proﬁts
generated by the company can either be distributed to shareholders (usually
in the form of dividends) or can increase the beneﬁt of with-proﬁt policies
(the common type of life insurance policies in Germany) resulting in a trade-
oﬀ between shareholders’ earnings and policyholders’ beneﬁts. Additionally,
as argued in Fama & Jensen (1983), owners have a moral hazard opportunity,
since they can change the company’s attitude towards risk without conferring
with policyholders.
The conﬂict described above does not apply to mutual insurers, because
policyholders are at the same time the sole owners of the company. For public
insurers, the role of policyholders and owners is separated (as is with stock
companies), but a non-proﬁt basis as the intention of the owner is prescribed
by the statutes (similar to the mutual insurer). On the other hand, the
public owner may act contrary to policyholders’ concerns (and to the public
beneﬁt as well). Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny (1996) argue that politicians
cause government-owned ﬁrms to employ excess labor inputs, and Krueger
(1990) suggests that managers in the public sector are primarily employed
on political grounds.
As stated above, previous literature on corporate structure and agency
costs mainly focused on two main hypotheses (see, for example, Cummins
et al. (2004)). Firstly, the eﬃcient structure hypothesis predicts that stock
and mutual ﬁrms operate on diﬀerent frontiers and that each have a com-
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parative advantage in agency and production costs on their respective own
frontier. For the analysis of the German life insurance market it seems rea-
sonable to conclude that stock, mutual and public ﬁrms operate on separate
production frontiers, since all three types have been in existence for centuries,
still share the market and have not been able to replace each other. Secondly,
the expense preference hypothesis says that stock ﬁrms are more eﬃcient in
minimizing costs and maximizing revenues due to better reduction of agency
conﬂicts. With respect to the German insurance market, it can be assumed
that stock insurers’ cost eﬃciency frontier dominates the cost frontiers of
mutual and public ones.
Recent empirical work on the eﬃciency of German insurance companies
dates back to the early 1980s. This thesis tries to ﬁll the gap, update re-
sults for Germany and compare the eﬃciency of diﬀerent forms of ownership
with results from other countries. To test the hypotheses described above, a
non-parametric eﬃcient frontier approach as in Cummins et al. (1999) and
Cummins et al. (2004) is used.
This hypothesis will be ﬁrstly examined based on the form of ownership
of the insurance company itself. Subsequently we rerun our calculations for
the ownership structure of the holding company. In this context we present
the holding structure hypothesis, which states that the corporate structure
of a holding company has an inﬂuence on the eﬃciency of its respective sub-
sidiaries. We analyze this hypothesis in manifold ways. First, we show that
the re-parted sample due to the form of ownership on the highest corporation
level is signiﬁcant in terms of an own technology, and showed similar results
as at the ﬁrm level. Secondly, we assume that a stock insurer owned by a
mutual holding company (mutual stock insurer) and a stock insurer owned
by a public holding company (public stock insurer) tend to act like a mutual
insurer and a public insurer, respectively. These hybrid forms of ownership
lack the typical properties of a stock company. Mutual stock insurers are not
able to use any of the control mechanisms of the stock companies mentioned
befor since the sole owner is a mutual body. Public stock insurers may face
the same uneconomic decisions by political representatives of their public
owner as “pure” public companies do.
Moreover, the relation between the eﬃciency of an insurance company
and other observable ﬁrm characteristics such as size, policy cancellation
rate, complaints ratio and gross premium level is investigated. Since DEA
deﬁnes eﬃciency in terms of social welfare and identiﬁes eﬃcient ﬁrms, we
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ﬁnally try to explain the consequences of ineﬃcient insurance companies for
their owners and policyholders. And ﬁnally, our last question is, do eﬃcient
ﬁrms oﬀer advantages to policyholders or owners?
3.2 Data Envelopment Analysis
The methodology used in this thesis was originally developed by Farrell
(1957) and (for the purpose of eﬃciency measurement of insurance com-
panies) expanded by Cummins et al. (1999) and used also in Cummins et al.
(2004). For analyzing production frontiers we employ the input-oriented
distance function (see, for example, Thanassoulis (2001)). We consider a
sample of N ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm is a DMU (Decision Making Unit) repre-
sented by an input vector xi =
(
x
(i)
1 , . . . , x
(i)
k
) ∈ Rk+, and an output vector
yi =
(
y
(i)
1 , . . . , y
(i)
m
) ∈ Rm+ . The set V (y) denotes the subset of Rk+ of the input
vectors xi that can produce at least yi, for i = 1, . . . , N (each i is a DMUs).
We assume V (y) is a closed and convex set.
Farrell’s measure of input technical eﬃciency T (xi, yi) is D(xi, yi)
−1 with
D(xi, yi) = sup{θ : (yi, xi
θ i
) ∈ V (y)}.
The quantity D(xi, yi) must be ≥ 1, and T (xi, yi) is ≤ 1 but > 0 1.
Relying on the previous studies on insurance companies’ eﬃciency, we use
a constant return to scale (CRS) DEA model. The CRS approach is quite
comprehensive for our purpose because it represents the optimal outcome
from an economic perspective. CRS identiﬁes deviations from the optimal
scale as ineﬃciency.2
The technical eﬃciency as deﬁned above is a linear programming problem.
Using the duality of max/min problems in linear programming and concretiz-
ing the quite abstract equation above we can derive the following equations
1Let all inputs of a DMU be contracted radially as far as feasible, without detriment to
its output levels. The technical eﬃciency of the DMU is the maximum proportion of any
one of its contracted input levels is of the observed level of that input(see Thanassoulis
(2001))
2Moreover, the CRS model allows to perform so called cross-eﬃciency measures to
check for predominance of one production technology over the others (see below).
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over all DMUs:
minθλ θ
s.t. − yi + Y λ ≥ 0
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0
λ ≥ 0
where θ = T (xi, yi) is the technical eﬃciency of the ith-DMU (ﬁrm i) with
(xi, yi) the associated input/output vector of that ﬁrm, λ is a N + 1 vector
of constants, being N the Number of DMUs (ﬁrms), X is the matrix of all
inputs and Y the matrix of all outputs (see Coelli (1996)).
The minimum cost function or cost frontier is deﬁned in a similar way
using the distance function deﬁned above. Let wi = (w
i
1, . . . , w
i
k) denote
the input price vector corresponding to the input vector xi. Then the cost
frontier is deﬁned as:
C(wi, yi) = min
xi
{w′ixi : D(xi, yi) ≥ 1}
overall DMUs, which can be rewritten as
C(wi, yi) = min
xi
{w′ixi : (xi, yi) ∈ V (y)}.
The optimal input vector x˜i minimizes the costs of producing output yi when
input prices wi are given. Cost eﬃciency is deﬁned as the ratio
γ =
w′ix˜i
w′ixi
,
where xi is the actual input vector used by the respective DMU.
Equivalent to technical eﬃciency, cost eﬃciency is estimated by solving
a linear programming problem over all DMUs that is described as follows.
minλ,x∗i w
′
ix
∗
i
s.t. − yi + Y λ ≥ 0
θx∗i −Xλ ≥ 0
N1′λ = 1
λ ≥ 0
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with wi being the vector of input prices, x
∗
i being the cost minimal vector of
input quantities for the i-th DMU given the input prices wi and the output
levels yi (see Coelli (1996)).
Allocative eﬃciency for a DMU is estimated by using the relationship
C(xi, yI) = T (xi, yi) ∗ A(xi, yi),
where C(xi, yi) is cost eﬃciency, T (xi, yi) is technical eﬃciency and A(xi, yi)
is allocative eﬃciency. Allocative eﬃciency measures the eﬃciency of the
allocation of inputs for given prices and outputs.
To test the eﬃcient structure hypothesis, we ﬁrst pool all DMUs to cal-
culate the eﬃciency for stock, mutual and public insurers with respect to
a joint production frontier (and joint cost frontier, respectively). However,
pooling may not be an appropriate approach because each ﬁrm is compared
against members of its own group in addition to members of other groups,
and the ineﬃciency might result from within-groups eﬀects instead of the de-
sired between-groups eﬀects (see Brockett, Chang, Rousseau, Semple & Yang
(2004)). If each group operates on its own production frontier (i.e. using its
unique production technology), pooled results will be biased. Therefore,
we estimate distance functions for all three groups with respect to various
reference sets. For example, the technical eﬃciency of stock insurers (s)
with respect to a reference set consisting of stock ﬁrms only is denoted by
TS(xs, ys).
To test for the existence of separate production frontiers, we calculate
TS(xsi, ysi), TM(xml, yml) and TP (xpj, ypj)
3, respectively, and compare within-
group eﬃciencies with pooled results. The same method is used to test for the
existence of separate cost frontiers. Moreover, we compute cross-eﬃciency
measures (as in Cummins et al. (1999) and Cummins et al. (2004)) as the
distance of stock ﬁrms to the mutual frontier and the public frontier, distance
of mutual ﬁrms to the stock frontier and the public frontier, and, ﬁnally, the
distance of public ﬁrms to the stock frontier and the mutual frontier, i.e. each
group of ﬁrms is measured against the frontiers of the two remaining groups.
For example, cross technical eﬃciency for one stock ﬁrm (i) with reference
to the set of mutual ﬁrms is given by:
TM(xi,s, yi,s) = [DM(xi,s, yi,s) = sup{θ : (yi,s, xi,s
θi
) ∈ V M(y)}]−1.
3for i = 1, . . . , I (number of stock ﬁrms), l = 1, . . . , L number of mutual ﬁrms and
j = 1, . . . , J number of public ﬁrms.
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Although within-group eﬃciency is always ≤ 1 (i.e. a ﬁrm is not able to op-
erate better than the most eﬃcient ﬁrm(s) within its group), cross-eﬃciency
can even be > 1. If a ﬁrm’s cross-eﬃciency is > 1, the ﬁrm’s input/output
combination is unfeasible when using the production technology of the ref-
erence group.4
4Cross-eﬃciencies can be calculated under the assumption of CRS only. When using
DEA with Variable Returns to Scale (VRS), the problem of comparability of the three
diﬀerent subsamples in our analysis would call for methods like mutual projection (see
e.g. Steinmann, Dittrich, Karmann & Zweifel (2004)).
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Figure 1: Illustration of a double-input (x1, x2) and single-output model (y)
In ﬁgure 1 we illustrate a simpliﬁed double-input/one-output framework
for two diﬀerent technologies. LS(y) is the eﬃcient frontier for stock insurers
and LM(y) is the one for mutual insurers. The point b(xS, yS) is a DMU and
represents a single stock insurer, whereas the point e(xM , yM) is a mutual
insurer (to make this illustration possible, constant output y is assumed). In
this graph, it can be easily seen that technical eﬃciency is measured as the
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relation of the length of the vector determined by the point of the DMU to
the length of the vector determined by the intersection point of the eﬃcient
frontier and the line through the DMU point and the origin. Technical X-
eﬃciency then is measured on the other eﬃciency frontier.
Furthermore, based on the hypotheses explained above, we would expect
stock (mutual, public) insurers to operate in a region where stock (mutual,
public) production technology dominates. To test for this assumption, we
measure the distance between the three frontiers of all DMUs in our sample.
For example, the distance between the stock production frontier and the
mutual production frontier for a mutual insurer is deﬁned as:
DFT = 1− TM(xs, ys)
TS(xs, ys)
.
A distance value < 0 would imply that stock technology dominates mutual
technology for the respective input/output combination, a distance value > 0
would show mutual dominance. Distance values are calculated for all ﬁrms
and for all inter-group combinations. The respective distance formulas are
deﬁned in table 4. Moreover, we deﬁne and compute distance values for cost
frontiers and for allocative eﬃciency in an analogous way.
3.3 SW-Bootstrapping for DEA
As with other non-parametric methods, DEA has often been claimed as non-
statistical and many researchers have complained about the lack of statistical
properties so far. Moreover, since DEA scores are based on a ﬁnite sample of
DMUs, eﬃciency results are rather considered estimates of the true (but un-
observable) eﬃciency frontiers, which raises the question of the consistency
of these estimators and the rates of convergence. Consistency for DEA es-
timators was shown by Banker (1993) and Korostelev, Simar & Tsybakov
(1995), however, only under weak general conditions. When trying to mea-
sure the sensitivity of eﬃciency scores to the sampling variation, analytic
results on the sampling distribution can be obtained for a single-input DEA
only. For a multivariate DEA, however, the bootstrap is the only approach
for estimating the sampling variation of eﬃciency estimators. The bootstrap
method dates back to the late 1970s (Efron (1979)) and was ﬁrst used with
frontier models in Simar (1992). An application of bootstrapping to non-
parametric eﬃciency estimators was later introduced by Simar & Wilson
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(1998) and reﬁned by Simar & Wilson (2000). In order to distinguish their
approach from Loethgren (1998) and Loethgren & Tambour (1999), who
presented an alternative methodology for bootstrapping DEA eﬃciency esti-
mators, the literature refers to mehtod presented in Simar & Wilson (1998)
as SW-bootstrap, whereas the latter is named LT-bootstrap.
For our analysis, we use the SW-bootstrap to correct for the bias of the
DEA eﬃciency estimators.5 In general, bootstrapping is a repetitive re-
sampling of the data, applying the original estimator on each sample, so that
the underlying distribution is maintained and sensitivities of the estimators
are obtained. The generated value for technical eﬃciency for the ﬁrm i with
input xi and output yi is, as deﬁned before, T (xi, yi), but, under the bootstrap
methodology, this is just an estimator of the underlying real eﬃciency score
and thus denoted as ̂T (xi, yi). Based on the empirical distributions of the
̂T (xi, yi), a pseudo sample for the input vector xi is generated conditionally
on yi denoted as V (y)
∗ = (x∗i , yi). Then the bootstrap inputs are given by:
x̂∗i =
̂T (xi, yi)
T (x∗i , yi)
xi.
For a detailed description of the consistency of the estimators and possible
ways to smoothe the bootstrap estimators, see Simar & Wilson (1998) and
Simar & Wilson (2000).
Most calculations of these sections were programmed by using Matlab.
Additionally, a few estimations concerning the bootstrap estimations were
run by the free statistical computing software R which was supplemented by
the software library FEAR 1.0 (see Wilson (2008)).
4 Sample, Outputs and Inputs
4.1 Data
The data set consists of about 90 German (the exact number varies for each
year) life insurance companies over the period 2002-2005 totaling to 356
observations which represent more than 90% of the German life insurance
5See Simar & Wilson (2000) for a detailed description.
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market. The data has been compiled from audited annual reports of the
respective companies and was amended by the yearbooks of the Federal Fi-
nancial Supervisory Authority (Baﬁn) and the German Insurance Association
(GDV). Subdivided into groups by form of ownership, 73 mutual insurers,
263 stock insurers and 20 public insurers are analyzed. Summary statistics
of our data set are shown in section 4.3.
4.2 Outputs, Inputs, and Prices
The selection of appropriate variables representing inputs and outputs is
decisive as regards the validity of the results produced by DEA and is par-
ticularly diﬃcult for insurance companies (as compared to manufacturing
ﬁrms where attributing inputs to outputs is less challenging). Traditional
literature on the eﬃciency of insurance ﬁrms has used the so called “produc-
tion approach” to eﬃciency (see e.g. Cummins & Weiss (1993), Cummins
et al. (1999) and Cummins et al. (2004)), which was introduced by Berger
& Humphrey (1997), treating insurance companies like manufacturing com-
panies. However, especially the use of “claims paid” or “losses incurred” as
an output of the “production approach” has attracted criticism because an
unexpected upward change in losses (due to an environmental catastrophe or
a terrorist attack) would be considered an increase in output quantity and,
therefore, would result in eﬃciency enhancement of the respective company.
The “intermediation approach”, which was believed to be best to evaluate
ﬁnancial institutions (Berger & Humphrey (1997)) and which was recently
adopted by Brockett et al. (2004) and Brockett, Cooper, Golden, Rousseau &
Wang (2005), tries to overcome these shortfalls by treating an insurance com-
pany like a ﬁnancial intermediary and by selecting input and output variables
accordingly. Brockett et al. (2005) specify outputs as a combination of cer-
tain variables that are related to the goals of all stakeholders of the company:
claims paying ability (being in policyholders’ interests), return of investment
(for shareholders or, generally, company owners) and solvency scores (for
public beneﬁt). As shown below, we adopt the framework of Brockett et al.
(2005) for selecting a combination of output variables. However, the vari-
able of solvency was omitted, since the majority of the German life insurers
are not rated by any of the large rating companies (like A.M.Best, Fitch or
Standard and Poor’s).
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Outputs
Insurers’ output consists primarily of services provided to policyholders.6 The
principal contribution to social welfare of an insurance company is to insure
value. Consistent with recent insurance eﬃciency studies, services provided
by life insurers can be divided into risk bearing (assuming risk to decrease
potential personal losses), risk pooling (collecting funds from policyholders
and redistributing money to those policyholders who incurred losses) and
ﬁnancial intermediation (borrowing funds from policyholders and investing
them in ﬁnancial assets until they are paid back at policy expiration date).
We assume the amount of gross premium provided by a company to be a
good proxy for these services, since all of them are related to this key ﬁgure.
Risk bearing as well as risk pooling can be measured in terms of insurance
coverage, and the level of ﬁnancial intermediation services depends heavily
on the level of funds brought in by policyholders. This in turn is strongly
related to the amount of gross premiums. From the company owner’s point
of view, the main objective of an insurer is to achieve a certain proﬁt goal,
e.g. a required rate of return. Therefore, net income is chosen as output
variable as well.
Input and Prices
Consistent with traditional eﬃciency literature we deﬁne four inputs for life
insurance companies: labor, business services, ﬁnancial debt capital and eq-
uity capital.
The quantity of labor input is deﬁned as administration costs divided by
the average monthly wage of an employee in the German insurance industry
for the respective years (provided by the German Statistisches Bundesamt
(German Federal Statistical Oﬃce). The average monthly wage of an in-
surance employee can be interpreted as the price of labor input. Since a
good portion of business services in the life insurance industry are outside
services such as agent activities and broker commissions, we use acquisition
costs as an input, while input prices of business services are deﬁned by using
a price index for insurance services (provided by the German Statistisches
Bundesamt). Cost of capital for each year is deﬁned by the average return
of the German prime equity index DAX calculated for a period of ﬁve years
preceding the respective ﬁscal year. Cost of debt is deﬁned similarly using
6For a general discussion on output measurement and productivity of life insurance
companies, see Weiss (1986).
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the representative cross-section index of German government bonds REX.
Input and output prices were deﬂated to the base year 2002 by the German
Consumer Price Index.
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics. It can be seen that the level of gross pre-
miums and the amount of insurance coverage is signiﬁcantly higher for stock
ﬁrms (840.3 and 26132.3) than for mutual (523.3 and 19427.4) and public
insurers (230.5 and 7915.6). Return on assets (measured as net ﬁnancial
proﬁts to total assets) is highest for mutual insurers (4.9 vs. 4.7 and 4.5), al-
though the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. Acquisition costs and
operational expenses (as compared to gross premiums) are lowest for public
ﬁrms, with stock ﬁrms being the most expensive insurance vehicle (although
diﬀering from mutual insurers’ expenses only slightly). Furthermore, public
ﬁrms perform best when it comes to cancellation rates (i.e. ratio of policies
surrendered by policyholders to total number of policies in force), although
diﬀerences in values are not signiﬁcant. The policyholders’ complaints ratio
(measured as the ratio of complaints obtained from Federal Financial Super-
visory Authority (BAFin) to the total number of policies in force) is much
higher for mutual ﬁrms as compared to stock and public insurers. However,
these results should be interpreted cautiously, since numbers of complaints
were only available from quite a few public ﬁrms. Summary statistics also
show that stock ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly larger than mutuals or public ones in
terms of input (columns 9 and 10) and output (columns 11–14) quantities.
5 Eﬃciency Results
To test the eﬃcient structure hypothesis, i.e. that stock, mutual and public
ﬁrms operate on separate frontiers, we ﬁrst estimate the pooled production
frontier and the pooled cost frontier as well as the group-speciﬁc frontiers
for stock, mutual and public ﬁrms and check if pooled and group-speciﬁc
frontiers are diﬀerent. Table 2 presents sample mean values for technical
eﬃciency, cost eﬃciency and allocative eﬃciency for all three groups with
reference to the pooled data set as well as to the group-speciﬁc data set.
Results show that the mutual and public speciﬁc frontiers for technical
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eﬃciency are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the pooled production frontier
(based on the input distance function results). Moreover, at least the cost
frontier for public companies is not coinciding with the “general” cost
frontier calculated with respect to the pooled data set. Our tests did not
reject the hypothesis that the stock speciﬁc frontiers diﬀer from the pooled
ones. Nevertheless, the signiﬁcant diﬀerence between pooled and individual
results for mutual and public ﬁrms strongly indicates that comparisons of
at least technical eﬃciency should rather be based on results calculated
from group-speciﬁc frontiers. However, when doing so, a problem arises
with allocative eﬃciency, which can be interpreted as the ratio of cost and
technical eﬃciency scores: using pooled cost eﬃciency values together with
the more appropriate group-speciﬁc technical eﬃciency scores would lead to
an allocative eﬃciency mismatch because two diﬀerent reference sets would
be used for creating a single eﬃciency measure. Therefore, we decide to
abstract away from pooled frontier results and use only individual reference
sets instead.8
8Individual frontier eﬃciency scores cannot be compared per se because of the use of
diﬀerent reference sets. A smaller sample size of the respective benchmark / reference
set will, by nature, on average lead to higher DEA eﬃciency scores. Therefore, the use
of separate production and cost frontiers reﬂecting diﬀerent production technologies for
stock, mutual and public ﬁrms necessitates an X-eﬃciency analysis.
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Table 2: Mean values of eﬃciency scores for the reference set of all insurers
and for reference sets based on the organizational form of the companies
Sample means
M P S
Technical eﬃciency
All insurers 0.715 0.703 0.730
Subgroups 0.767 0.915 0.745
t-test *** ***
Cost eﬃciency
All insurers 0.360 0.353 0.391
Subgroups 0.361 0.740 0.380
t-test ***
Allocative eﬃciency
All insurers 0.505 0.491 0.536
Subgroups 0.469 0.805 0.505
t-test *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level,
Cross-frontier eﬃciencies are calculated to test whether each form of
ownership is dominant in producing its group-speciﬁc outputs. The re-
sults are shown in table 3. Remember that a certain production technology,
e.g. mutual technology, dominates competing technologies for a speciﬁc in-
put/output combination of a mutual insurer if the group-speciﬁc eﬃciency
value of this combination is smaller than cross-eﬃciency measures, e.g. if
Tm(ym, xm) < Ts(ym, xm) and Tm(ym, xm) < Tp(ym, xm) for any mutual DMU
with ym and xm, respectively.
In the face of the eﬃcient structure hypothesis we compare technical ef-
ﬁciency ﬁrst. The results reported in the ﬁrst row of table 3 suggest that
mutual technology dominates public technology in producing mutual ﬁrms’
output (0.767 vs. 1.013)9, but is dominated signiﬁcantly by stock technology
(0.507). The average eﬃciency values for public ﬁrms with respect to their
group-speciﬁc frontier (0.915) are signiﬁcantly larger than stock and mutual
scores (0.475 and 0.679, respectively), leading to the conclusion that pub-
9Sample mean values larger than 1 indicate that it is not feasible to replicate the
input/output combination of mutual ﬁrms with public technology.
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lic technology is inferior in producing its group-speciﬁc input/output mix
compared to stock and mutual technology. Finally, stock technology sig-
niﬁcantly dominates both mutual and public technology in producing stock
companies’ input/output combination (0.747 vs. 0.941 and 1.383, resp.). In
view of the eﬃcient structure hypothesis, these ﬁndings are surprising, since
at least public insurers seem to be highly ineﬃcient in producing their spe-
ciﬁc input/output mix. In contrast, stock technology is superior not only in
producing stock speciﬁc outputs but also dominates mutual and public ﬁrms
with respect to their group-speciﬁc production.
Comparing X-eﬃciency scores for cost eﬃciency (row 2 of table 3), it can
be seen that mutual ﬁrms are predominantly cost-eﬃcient as compared to
public companies for producing mutual input/output combinations (0.361
vs. 0.715) and do even better (although insigniﬁcantly) than stock insurers
(0.373). With respect to public input/output matrices, public ﬁrms are sig-
niﬁcantly dominated by both stock and mutual companies (0.740 vs. 0.350
and 0.570, resp.). Finally, the results show that stock insurers seem to oper-
ate in a highly cost-eﬃcient way (0.380) when compared to mutual (0.728)
and public ones (0.922) in producing stock speciﬁc outputs. Although these
ﬁndings are generally in accordance with the traditional cost eﬃciency hy-
pothesis, the X-cost eﬃciency scores for mutual insurers which show a rela-
tively high degree of cost eﬃciency are noteworthy.
To sum up the results for allocative eﬃciency (row 3 of table 3), one can
see that both mutual and stock insurers allocate their resources eﬃciently
when producing group-speciﬁc outputs (for mutual ﬁrms: 0.469 vs. 0.780
and 0.762, resp.; for stock ﬁrms: 0.508 vs. 0.801 and 0.729, resp). These
diﬀerences in means are highly signiﬁcant and large in size. For producing
public input/output combinations, public ﬁrms show a slightly (insignif-
icantly) higher degree of allocative eﬃciency than mutual ﬁrms (0.805
vs. 0.831) and are a little less eﬃcient than stock ﬁrms (0.805 vs. 0.723),
although the diﬀerences in means are signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level only.
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Table 3: Mean values of eﬃciency scores and X-eﬃciency scores for three
groups of insurers, i.e. stock (S), mutual (M) and public (P)
Sample means t-tests
Tm(ym, xm) Tp(ym, xm) Ts(ym, xm) Tm : Tp Tm : Ts
M 0.767 1.013 0.507 *** ***
Tp(yp, xp) Tm(yp, xp) Ts(yp, xp) Tp : Tm Tp : Ts
P 0.915 0.679 0.475 *** ***
Ts(ys, xs) Tm(ys, xs) Tp(ys, xs) Ts : Tm Ts : Tp
S 0.747 0.941 1.383 *** ***
Cm(ym, xm) Cp(ym, xm) Cs(ym, xm) Cm : Cp Cm : Cs
M 0.361 0.715 0.373 ***
Cp(yp, xp) Cm(yp, xp) Cs(yp, xp) Cp : Cm Cp : Cs
P 0.740 0.570 0.350 *** ***
Cs(ys, xs) Cm(ys, xs) Cp(ys, xs) Cs : Cm Cs : Cp
S 0.380 0.728 0.922 *** ***
Am(ym, xm) Ap(ym, xm) As(ym, xm) Am : Ap Am : As
M 0.469 0.780 0.762 *** ***
Ap(yp, xp) Am(yp, xp) As(yp, xp) Ap : Am Ap : As
P 0.805 0.831 0.723 *
As(ys, xs) Am(ys, xs) Ap(ys, xs) As : Am As : Ap
S 0.508 0.801 0.729 *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
To analyze cross-eﬃciency results further, we use the frontier diﬀerence
functions DF deﬁned above. Results are shown in table 4, where values
smaller than 0 indicate that the stock frontier dominates the mutual frontier,
and values larger than 0 indicate that mutuals dominate stocks.
To test if eﬃciency results are inﬂuenced by ﬁrm size we split each group
sample into quartiles and calculate frontier diﬀerences for the respective sub-
groups sorted by size. Since the subsample of public ﬁrms is small and quar-
tile results would be heavily biased by ﬁrm-speciﬁc results, we only compare
the subsamples of stock and mutual ﬁrms. Again, results in column 1 in-
dicate that stock technology by and large dominates mutual technology for
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producing stock outputs. However, sorting our samples into quartiles allows
for more insight into our previous ﬁndings: it becomes obvious that the pro-
duction frontier distance is largest for the smallest quartile (-0.784), thus,
the predominance of stock insurers seems to be present especially with small
ﬁrms. Mid-sized stock companies still signiﬁcantly dominate mutual technol-
ogy in producing stock speciﬁc outputs, but the diﬀerences are now smaller
(-0.158 and -0.203). Surprisingly, we now ﬁnd that mutual technology sig-
niﬁcantly dominates stock technology for the largest quartile. To conclude,
the superiority of stock technology as presented in table 3 seems to stem
from the technical eﬃciency of smaller stock insurers. When looking at pro-
duction frontier diﬀerences for mutual inputs/outputs, column 2 shows the
highly signiﬁcant dominance of stock ﬁrms over mutual ones. The frontier
diﬀerences are relatively large and decreasing with size, leading to the overall
conclusion that small stock ﬁrms generally show a higher degree of technical
eﬃciency than large stock companies (compared to the respective mutual
ﬁrms).
Cost frontier diﬀerences (columns 5 and 6) indicate that stock ﬁrms operate
more eﬃciently than mutual ones in producing stock speciﬁc outputs. The
diﬀerence is by far largest for the smallest quartile (-1.376), roughly the same
for mid-sized stock insurers (-0.896 and -0.910), and clearly smallest for the
last quartile (-0.446). All values are signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. In contrast,
mutual ﬁrms’ cost frontier dominates the stock cost frontier for all quartiles
when producing mutual outputs. Although all diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at
least at the 0.05 level, they are very small in size (from 0.099 to 0.033).
By sorting allocative eﬃciency scores by size (columns 3 and 4), we ﬁnd
overall predominance of stock ﬁrms over mutual ﬁrms when producing stock
outputs, with the smallest diﬀerence for the smallest quartile (-0.443) and
roughly the same values for the remaining quartiles (-0.674, -0.670 and -
0.698, resp.). On the other hand, mutual ﬁrms signiﬁcantly dominate stock
ﬁrms for all quartiles when producing mutual outputs. Here, in contrast to
allocative diﬀerences for producing stock outputs, diﬀerences are smaller and
decreasing with size (from 0.453 to 0.333).
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6 Inﬂuence of the Form of Ownership of the
Holding Company on Firm’s Eﬃciency
Many of the life insurance companies in Germany are part of a holding com-
pany. The legal structure of the holding company is in some cases diﬀerent
from the structure at the ﬁrm level. In this sequence we follow the hypothesis
that a ﬁrm acts the same way as its holding company does. This assumption
is based on the idea that a stock ﬁrm that is 100% owned by a mutual or
public ﬁrm acts in a similar way as its mother company does.
Therefore, we restructured our data set into three groups depending on
the form of ownership of the highest ﬁrm level (if there is no holding, the
ownership form of the ﬁrm is taken into account). Then we analyze the
equivalent questions as done in the previous section. The newly structured
data set consists of 156 data points for a stock insurance holding (about 40
companies in the observed time period 2002-2005), 155 data points for ﬁrms
with a mutual holding (or 40 companies) and 45 with a public holding (11
companies).
In table 5 we present the results of the diﬀerences in eﬃciency between
the pooled and the individual samples.
We observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences for technical eﬃciency just for the pub-
lic ﬁrms. No signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the pooled mean of technical
eﬃciency and the mean on their own frontier could be found for mutual
and stock insurers. Therefore, in this reorganized sample, we can only be
sure that public ﬁrms act on their own technical frontier. The situation is
diﬀerent at the cost and allocative frontier, where we can ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
deviation of the pooled from the individual sample in all three categories.
But as already stated before, the diﬀerences between the eﬃciency frontiers
can be seen best when calculating the X-eﬃciencies.
In table 6 we compare the own eﬃciency frontier of each group with the
cross frontier. To test once more the eﬃcient structure hypothesis in this
environment, we compare technical eﬃciency ﬁrst (remember that a smaller
value means that the technology dominates the higher value). In the ﬁrst
row, mutual ﬁrms are measured on their own frontier with an average of
0.720 eﬃciency score compared to 0.892 on the public and 0.610 on the
stock frontier, deviations are signiﬁcant. This means that mutual technology
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Table 5: Pooled vs. own frontier on holding level
Sample means
Mutual Public Stock
Technical eﬃciency
Pooled 0.718 0.715 0.736
Individual 0.720 0.833 0.747
t-test ***
Cost eﬃciency
Pooled 0.379 0.338 0.398
Individual 0.431 0.618 0.436
t-test *** *** ***
Allocative eﬃciency
Pooled 0.533 0.464 0.540
Individual 0.603 0.740 0.585
t-test *** *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level,
** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level,
* signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
dominates public’s in producing mutual outputs. Stock technology, however,
signiﬁcantly dominates mutual technology regarding mutual outputs.
In the second row, we have ﬁrms with a public holding, their mean perfor-
mance was 0.833 on their own frontier. Estimated on the mutual frontier an
average of 0.567 and on the stock frontier an average of 0.571 was estimated
for public inputs and outputs. The diﬀerence is only signiﬁcant for the stock
frontier. As a result, we ﬁnd that stock technology dominates the technology
of ﬁrms with a public holding.
In the third row the same estimations were done for stock insurers. In
their own technology, stock insurers are as eﬃcient as measured on the fron-
tier of ﬁrms with a mutual holding (0.747 vs. 0.735) and even more eﬃcient
in the technology of public insurers (1.141).
The eﬃcient structure hypothesis that each form of ownership acts most
eﬃciently on its own frontier must be denied. Stock insurers operate on a
more eﬃcient frontier. The results for technical eﬃciency at the the holding
level are very much the same as the results at the ﬁrm level (cf. table 3).
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The expense preference hypothesis, which says that stock ﬁrms are most
eﬃcient concerning their cost structure because of dealing better with man-
ager/owner conﬂicts, could be conﬁrmed in this setting. Estimating the cost
eﬃciency (second part of table 6) shows that the cost eﬃciency frontier of
insurers with a stock holding is dominated by ﬁrms with a mutual or public
holding. Evidence for a dominance of ﬁrms with a mutual holding over ﬁrms
with a public holding could be found as well, but was not as explicit as the
dominance of stock insurers over public insurers.
The third part of table 6 presents the results for allocative eﬃciency. It
is shown, that ﬁrms with a mutual or stock holding are most eﬃcient in
their own technology, only public ﬁrms are dominated by stock technology
for public inputs and outputs.
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Table 6: Eﬃciency results on holding level
Sample means T-tests
Tm(ym, xm) Tp(ym, xm) Ts(ym, xm) Tm : Tp Tm : Ts
Mutual 0.720 0.892 0.610 *** ***
Tp(yp, xp) Tm(yp, xp) Ts(yp, xp) Tp : Tm Tp : Ts
Public 0.833 0.567 0.571 ***
Ts(ys, xs) Tm(ys, xs) Tp(ys, xs) Ts : Tm Ts : Tp
Stock 0.747 0.735 1.141 ***
Cm(ym, xm) Cp(ym, xm) Cs(ym, xm) Cm : Cp Cm : Cs
Mutual 0.431 0.661 0.422 *** ***
Cp(yp, xp) Cm(yp, xp) Cs(yp, xp) Cp : Cm Cp : Cs
Public 0.618 0.403 0.309 *** ***
Cs(ys, xs) Cm(ys, xs) Cp(ys, xs) Cs : Cm Cs : Cp
Stock 0.436 0.521 0.877 *** ***
Am(ym, xm) Ap(ym, xm) As(ym, xm) Am : Ap Am : As
Mutual 0.603 0.811 0.735 *** ***
Ap(yp, xp) Am(yp, xp) As(yp, xp) Ap : Am Ap : As
Public 0.740 0.707 0.672 **
As(ys, xs) Am(ys, xs) Ap(ys, xs) As : Am As : Ap
Stock 0.585 0.754 0.828 *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
To analyze cross-eﬃciency results further, we use, as already done in
the last section, the frontier diﬀerence function DF 10. Results are shown in
table 7. Table 7 consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst part, DF was calculated
for ﬁrms with a stock or mutual holding, respectively (values larger than
0 indicate that mutuals dominate stocks and vice versa). In the second
part, ﬁrms with a stock holding are compared to ﬁrms with a public holding
(values larger than 0 indicate that publics dominate stocks and vice versa).
In the third part, mutuals and publics are compared; values bigger than
0 indicate that publics dominate mutuals and vice versa. The ﬁrms are
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divided into four quartiles by size (smallest in the ﬁrst quartile). In order to
test for size eﬀects, we sort the three subgroups into quartiles and calculate
frontier diﬀerences, which are represented in table 7.
In the very ﬁrst column of table 7 we see that for the small and medium-
sized ﬁrms (1st-3rd quartile) the stock frontier dominates the mutual as re-
gards stock in- and output. Only for the large ﬁrms we get a similar result
as in the previous chapter for ﬁrm level, namely that ﬁrms with a mutual
holding dominate the ﬁrms with a stock holding. As regards the frontier dif-
ferences of mutual in- and output, values for all quartiles are negative, which
is evidence for a domination of the stock technology, but the values of the
frontier diﬀerences are not signiﬁcant and very close to zero. Therefore, no
statistically relevant domination can be stated.
Results for allocative eﬃciency (second column, ﬁrst part of table 7) show
that each production frontier seems to be more eﬃcient for the respective in-
and outputs.
The cost eﬃciency hypothesis can be conﬁrmed for the ownership struc-
ture of the holding company as well, stock technology dominates mutual for
stock in- and output. For big companies the distance to the frontier is very
small.
In the second part of table 7 we compare ﬁrms with a public holding to
ﬁrms with a stock holding. The results are very clear, for all three forms of
eﬃciency stocks dominate the publics. Especially stock insurers are appar-
ently much more cost-eﬃcient than public ﬁrms, which corresponds to most
of the theory.
The third part of table 7 compares ﬁrms with a mutual holding to ﬁrms
with a public one. Dominance of the mutual over the public is given on
almost all quartiles and eﬃciency measures, but values are not as high as
values comparing public to stock insurers.
10Recall that DF is the distance function, deﬁned by
DFT = 1− TM (xs, ys)
TS(xs, ys)
.
A distance value < 0 would imply that stock technology dominates mutual technology for
the respective input/output combination, a distance value > 0 would show dominance of
mutual technology .
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Results for cost eﬃciency show a clear order between the diﬀerent forms
of ownership of the holding company: stock dominates mutuals and mutuals
dominate public ﬁrms. All the results are constrained to the chosen in- and
output.
7 Holding Companies of Stock Insurers
For further research, it is interesting to specify stock ﬁrms according to their
ownership structure. In the next section, we analyze stock ﬁrms as to whether
their holding structure is organized as a stock, as a mutual or as a public. As
mentioned above, only stock insurers can be owned by a holding company.
We assume that a stock insurer owned by a mutual holding company (mutual
stock insurer, henceforth) and a stock insurer owned by a public holding
company (public stock insurer, henceforth) tend to act like a mutual insurer
and a public insurer, respectively. These hybrid forms of ownership lack the
typical properties of a stock company. Mutual stock insurers are not able
to use any of the control mechanisms of stock companies listed before, since
the sole owner is a mutual body. Public stock insurers may face the same
uneconomic decisions by political representatives of their public owner as
“pure” public companies do. Therefore, it seems reasonable to re-run our
eﬃciency analysis after dividing stock insurers into three groups based on
the structure of the respective holding company.
Redeﬁned by the corporate structure of the respective holding compa-
nies, the 263 stock ﬁrms can be split into 156 stock insurers owned by a
stock holding company (“pure” stock insurers), 82 stock insurers owned by
a mutual holding (mutual stock insurers) and 25 stock insurers owned by a
public holding (public stock insurers).
In table 8 the descriptive statistics are summarized, but also include the
data at the ﬁrm level. Now comparison between, for example,“pure” mutuals
and mutuals is easier. It can be seen that mutual stock insurers are the
smallest in terms of gross premium, amount of insurance coverage, etc. and
are even smaller than “pure” mutual and public companies. On the other
hand, public stock insurers are larger than “pure” public companies and
“pure” mutual ones. By all means, “pure” stock insurers (i.e. stock insurers
owned by stock holdings) are the largest with respect to gross premium,
amount of insurance coverage and all input and output quantities.
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Table 9 shows the diﬀerences in means for technical, allocative and cost
eﬃciency for all three subgroups. For technical eﬃciency, no signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent scores can be found between the three subgroups of stock insurers.
However, the subgroup of public stock insurers SP do signiﬁcantly worst
in terms of allocative (0.442 vs. 0.540 and 0.558, resp.) and cost eﬃciency
(0.326 vs. 0.398 and 0.395) compared to “pure” stock ﬁrms SS and mutual
stocks SM . These ﬁndings suggest to take a further look on eﬃciency
differences among the three subgroups of stock insurers.
Table 9: Mean values of eﬃciency scores for the three subgroups of stock
insurers, i.e. “pure” stocks (SS), mutual stocks (SM) and public stocks (SP )
Sample means T-tests
Pure stock Mutual stock Public stock SS vs. SM SM vs. SP SS vs. SP
Pooled
Technical eﬃciency 0.736 0.720 0.724
Allocative eﬃciency 0.540 0.558 0.442 *** ***
Cost eﬃciency 0.398 0.395 0.326 *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
To gain further insight into diﬀerences of stock insurers that are owned by
a diﬀerently organized holding company, we ﬁrst calculate separate frontiers
for technical, cost and allocative eﬃciency for all three subgroups and
compare the results with eﬃciency scores that were computed with reference
to the set of all stock insurers. Table 10 presents mean eﬃciency scores for
diﬀerent reference sets. It can be seen clearly that technical eﬃciency values
for mutual stocks and public stocks are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent and measured
against their respective subgroup-speciﬁc reference set. The results for
allocative and cost eﬃciency are even more striking. Diﬀerences in means
are signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level for all three subgroups of stock insurers.
These ﬁndings strongly support our hypothesis that the organizational form
of the holding company has signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the corporate behavior of
the respective stock subsidiary which, in turn, diﬀerences leads to diﬀerent
degrees of eﬃciency.
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Table 10: Mean values of eﬃciency scores for the reference set of all stock
insurers and for reference sets based on the organizational form of the holding
company
Sample means
SM SP SS
Technical eﬃciency
All stock insurers 0.720 0.724 0.736
Subgroup based on holding company 0.768 0.867 0.747
t-test ** ***
Cost eﬃciency
All stock insurers 0.395 0.326 0.398
Subgroup based on holding company 0.476 0.642 0.436
t-test *** *** ***
Allocative eﬃciency
All stock insurers 0.558 0.442 0.540
Subgroup based on holding company 0.558 0.734 0.585
t-test *** *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level,
** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level,
* signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
To examine whether there is any dominance of one subgroup of stock
insurers over the other ones, we compute X-eﬃciency scores for all three
subgroups and compare them with eﬃciency values calculated with respect
to the subgroup-speciﬁc reference sets. The results are given in table 11.
Comparing the technical eﬃciency of the three subgroups of stock insurers,
row 1 shows that mutual stocks are signiﬁcantly dominated by “pure”
stocks (0.767 vs. 0.623), but dominate public stocks (0.767 vs. 1.014) when
producing their subgroup-speciﬁc outputs. For producing public stock in-
surers input/output combinations, public stocks are signiﬁcantly dominated
by both mutual stock and “pure” stock companies (0.867 vs. 0.748 and
0.591, resp.). Finally, “pure” stock insurers are technically predominant
in producing their speciﬁc outputs (0.747 vs. 0.860 and 1.194). To sum
up, neither of the hybrid forms of ownership is technically superior to
“pure” stock insurers for producing their subgroup-speciﬁc input/output
combinations. Exactly the same results can be found for X-cost eﬃciencies
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(see row 2 of table 13)). Our ﬁndings regarding allocative eﬃciency of
the three subgroups of stock insurers are slightly diﬀerent. Here, not only
“pure” stock ﬁrms but also mutual stock insurers most eﬃciently allocate
their resources for producing their respective subgroup-speciﬁc outputs.
However, public stock ﬁrms do worst compared to “pure” stock and mutual
stock insurers (0.736 vs. 0.644 and 0.563, resp.), although the diﬀerence
between public stocks and “pure” stocks is signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level only.
Table 11: Mean values of eﬃciency scores and X-eﬃciency scores for all three
subgroups of stock insurers, i.e. “pure” stocks (SS), mutual stocks (SM) and
public stocks (SP )
Sample means T-tests
Tm(ym, xm) Tp(ym, xm) Ts(ym, xm) Tm : Tp Tm : Ts
SM 0.767 1.014 0.623 *** ***
Tp(yp, xp) Tm(yp, xp) Ts(yp, xp) Tp : Tm Tp : Ts
SP 0.867 0.748 0.591 *** ***
Ts(ys, xs) Tm(ys, xs) Tp(ys, xs) Ts : Tm Ts : Tp
SS 0.747 0.860 1.194 *** ***
Cm(ym, xm) Cp(ym, xm) Cs(ym, xm) Cm : Cp Cm : Cs
SM 0.476 0.738 0.420 *** ***
Cp(yp, xp) Cm(yp, xp) Cs(yp, xp) Cp : Cm Cp : Cs
SP 0.642 0.422 0.389 *** ***
Cs(ys, xs) Cm(ys, xs) Cp(ys, xs) Cs : Cm Cs : Cp
SS 0.436 0.556 0.934 *** ***
Am(ym, xm) Ap(ym, xm) As(ym, xm) Am : Ap Am : As
SM 0.625 0.799 0.722 *** ***
Ap(yp, xp) Am(yp, xp) As(yp, xp) Ap : Am Ap : As
SP 0.736 0.563 0.644 *** *
As(ys, xs) Am(ys, xs) Ap(ys, xs) As : Am As : Ap
SS 0.585 0.695 0.844 *** ***
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
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In order to test for size eﬀects, we sort the three subgroups into quartiles
and calculate frontier diﬀerences, which are presented in table 12. The ﬁrst
section shows that “pure” stock insurers generally dominate mutual stock
ﬁrms for producing “pure” stock as well as mutual stocks output, and the
distance between production frontiers is signiﬁcant for all quartiles. When
producing stock outputs, the diﬀerence is decreasing with size (from -0.335
to 0.066). However, mutual stock technology is signiﬁcantly dominant for
the largest quartile, although the diﬀerence is small in size (0.066). A signiﬁ-
cant dominance of “pure” stock insurers can also be found with cost frontier
diﬀerences.12Again, there is a decreasing tendency of dominance with size
(for stock outputs: from -0.457 to -0.101; for mutual outputs: from -0.222 to
-0.130). The diﬀerences in allocative eﬃciency suggest that “pure” stocks
are eﬃcient for producing “pure” stock outputs, and mutual stock ﬁrms are
dominant in producing their speciﬁc input/output mix. However, mutual
stock insurers’ allocative dominance is not signiﬁcant for the smallest and
the largest quartile, and is only small in size. Comparing “pure” stock ﬁrms
and public stock insurers, we see that the latter are signiﬁcantly dominated
by “pure” stocks in terms of technical and cost eﬃciency for all quartiles
and for producing both “pure” stock and public stock outputs. Moreover,
“pure” stock ﬁrms dominate public stock ﬁrms even with respect to alloca-
tive eﬃciency, by all means, although the diﬀerences are hardly signiﬁcant
for mid-sized companies producing public stock outputs (-0.415 and -0.129).
Finally, section 3 of table 12 shows the signiﬁcant dominance of mutual stock
insurers over public stock insurers for technical, allocative and cost eﬃcien-
cies for all quartiles and all sorts of input/output combinations.
The previous results provide evidence that the holding company plays an
important role in classifying ﬁrms due to these criteria. Therefore, we ﬁ-
nally investigate the diﬀerences between “pure” mutual and mutual stock
and “pure” public and public stock. One would assume that a mutual and a
stock 100% owned by a mutual would act similarly concerning their agency
conﬂicts. The same argument might be true for public and public stock. In
table 13 we compare their individual and pooled frontiers to see if there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
12Only the diﬀerence for mutual stock outputs at quartile 3 is not signiﬁcant.
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Table 13: Mean values of eﬃciency scores of ﬁrms with mutual holding com-
pared with pure mutual and mutual stock and public holding with pure public
and public stock ﬁrms
Sample means T-tests
Mutual pooled pure mixed po/pu po/mi pu/mi
Technical eﬃciency 0.720 0.767 0.768 *** ***
Cost eﬃciency 0.431 0.361 0.476 *** ***
Allocative eﬃciency 0.603 0.469 0.625 *** **
Public pooled pure mixed po/pu po/mi pu/mi
Technical eﬃciency 0.830 0.915 0.867 *** *
Cost eﬃciency 0.618 0.739 0.642 ***
Allocative eﬃciency 0.739 0.806 0.736
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
po/pu stands for pooled vs. pure, po/mi for pooled vs. mixed
In table 13 we see that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in cost and al-
locative eﬃciency for mutual ﬁrms. For public ﬁrms we observe signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in technical eﬃciency. These results are not unambiguous, thus
we decide to calculate cross frontier for these two groups. The results are
shown in table 14
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Table 14: Mean values of cross eﬃciency scores of ﬁrms with a pure form of
ownership and a mixed form of ownership
Cross eﬃciency of pure vs. mixed T-tests
TM (xm, ym) TSM (xm, ym) TSM (xSm , ySm) TM (xSm , ySm) M : SM SM : M
Means 0.767 0.651 0.768 0.786 ***
CM (xm, ym) CSM (xm, ym) CSM (xSm , ySm) CM (xSm , ySm) M : SM SM : M
Means 0.361 0.449 0.476 0.614 *** ***
AM (xm, ym) ASM (xm, ym) ASM (xSm , ySm) AM (xSm , ySm) M : SM SM : M
Means 0.469 0.719 0.625 0.798 *** ***
TP (xp, yp) TSP (xp, yp) TSP (xSp , ySp) TP (xSp , ySp) P : SP SP : P
Means 0.915 0.796 0.867 1.166 *** ***
CP (xp, yp) CSP (xp, yp) CSP (xSp , ySp) CP (xSp , ySp) P : SP SP : P
Means 0.739 0.685 0.642 0.698
AP (xp, yp) ASP (xp, yp) ASP (xSp , ySp) AP (xSp , ySp) P : SP SP : P
Means 0.806 0.853 0.736 0.606 **
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
The results in table 14 provide evidence that mutual and mutual stock
ﬁrms operate on diﬀerent frontiers and that, except for technical eﬃciency,
each form of ownership is more eﬃcient in its own environment. As a conclu-
sion, we ﬁnd that, on average, mutual stock ﬁrms produce a higher output
level with same input quantities than the pure mutual and that they operate
on diﬀerent cost frontiers, but that each is eﬃcient in its own environment.
For pure public and public stock ﬁrms, we ﬁnd a similar but stronger result
with respect to technical eﬃciency: public stock ﬁrms are more eﬃcient than
pure public ﬁrms. On the other hand, we do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
results concerning cost eﬃciency. The evidence showing that pure public
ﬁrms and public stock ﬁrms operate on diﬀerent frontiers is not as strong as
for mutual ﬁrms.
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8 Determinants of Eﬃciency and Policy-
holder Concerns
Finally, we examine the hypothesis that ﬁrms which are eﬃcient within their
speciﬁc group can be identiﬁed by certain characteristics and key ﬁgures ob-
servable by stakeholders of the respective companies. We regress technical
eﬃciency and cost eﬃciency measures for all ﬁrms (calculated with reference
to their group-speciﬁc data set) on a set of independent variables such as
market, cancellation rate, etc. (all explanatory variables are listed and de-
scribed below). Tobit’s regression results for technical and cost eﬃciency
are represented in table 15. Tobit’s regression was chosen because of the
assumption of a latent (unobservable) dependent variable. This assumption
might be helpful to correct for the parametric DEA model (see Tobin (1958)).
Tobit’s regression is deﬁned as:
yi =
{
y∗i y
∗
i > 0
0 y∗i ≤ 0
Explanatory variables are:
Size: total assets
Size2: squared size to control for non-linear eﬀects in total assets
Can1: early cancellation rate
Can2: later cancellation rate
Lev: equity to debt
Assets/Ins: total assets to amount of insurance coverage
M : dummy variable (=1 for mutual ﬁrms; =0 for stock or public ﬁrms)
P dummy variable (=1 for public ﬁrms; =0 for others)
We estimated the following regression equations (with technical eﬃ-
ciency and cost eﬃciency as dependent variables), ﬁrst, regarding the ﬁrm
level, later regarding the holding level.13:
T (x, y) = α + β1 Size + β2 Size
2 + β3 Can1 + β4 Can2 + β5 Lev +
β6 Assets/Ins+ β7 M + β8P
C(x, y) = α + β1 Size + β2 Size
2 + β3 Can1 + β4 Can2 + β5 Lev +
13Estimations were made with the econometrics software EViews.
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β6 Assets/Ins+ β7 M + β8P
Table 15: Tobit’s regression analysis on technical and cost eﬃciency
Independent Technical eﬃciency Cost eﬃciency
Variables coeﬃcient signif. coeﬃcient signif.
C 0.7566 *** 0.3584 ∗ ∗ ∗
Size 0.4789 0.4490 ∗∗
Size2 1.93E − 11 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.31E − 11 ∗ ∗ ∗
Can1 −0.0012 ∗ ∗ ∗ −4.4E − 05
Can2 −0.0063 ∗ ∗ ∗ −0.00012
Lev 0.0005 ∗ ∗ ∗ −0.0001 ∗ ∗ ∗
Assets/Ins −0.5638 *** −0.5396 ∗ ∗ ∗
Mf 0.0424 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.1920 ∗ ∗ ∗
Pf 0.1573 *** 0.2391 ∗ ∗ ∗
N 344 344
R2 0.4615 0.7083
adjusted R2 0.4437 0.6986
Note:
*** signiﬁcant on the 0.01 level,
** signiﬁcant on the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant on the 0.1 level
Coeﬃcients are corrected by White’s heteroskedasticity test
Summarizing the results, we can observe that technical eﬃciency is, as
might be expected, negatively related to both cancellation rates. Further-
more, technically eﬃcient ﬁrms show a lower ratio of all assets to total in-
surance coverage. This might be an indication that these ﬁrms have rel-
atively more liabilities toward policyholders. Eﬃcient ﬁrms have a signif-
icantly higher leverage, although the coeﬃcient does not diﬀer much from
zero. The dummies for corporate structure show the expected sign and are
highly signiﬁcant both for technical as well as for cost eﬃciency. Firms op-
erating nearer to their group-speciﬁc cost frontiers also have a lower ratio
of total assets to insurance coverage. Moreover, cost eﬃciency is increasing
with market share, which is evidence for economies of scale. In contrast to
technical eﬃciency, cancellation rates do not show signiﬁcant explanatory
power for cost eﬃciency.
In a next step towards policyholder concerns, we want to ﬁnd out whether
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there is a correlation between the return on asset (RoA) and the individual
technical eﬃciency results for each ﬁrm. We analyze this by using Spearman’s
and Kendall’s rank correlation test as deﬁned in Kendall & Smith (1939) and
Spearman (1904) for each subgroup. The results are summarized in table 16.
Table 16: Spearman’s and Kendall’s rank correlation results
Spearman’s ρ Kendall’s τ p-values
Mutual
Technical eﬃciency 0.646 0.481 0∗∗∗ 1.80E − 09∗∗∗
Cost eﬃciency 0.806 0.6446 0∗∗∗ 7.47E − 16∗∗∗
Allocative eﬃciency 0.4436 0.3174 1.00E − 04∗∗∗ 7.28E − 05∗∗∗
Stock
Technical eﬃciency 0.5839 0.4331 0∗∗∗ 1.25E − 25∗∗∗
Cost eﬃciency 0.7758 0.6082 0∗∗∗ 6.74E − 49∗∗∗
Allocative eﬃciency 0.3211 0.2252 1.20E − 07∗∗∗ 5.29E − 08∗∗∗
Public
Technical eﬃciency 0.2647 0.1684 0.2584 0.3189
Cost eﬃciency 0.7053 0.5368 7.32E − 04∗∗∗ 6.38E − 04∗∗∗
Allocative eﬃciency 0.7504 0.5895 2.10E − 04∗∗∗ 1.42E − 04∗∗∗
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level, ** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
Obviously, there is a strong correlation between cost eﬃcient ﬁrms and
the RoAs. This is true for stock, public and mutual ﬁrms. Allocative eﬃ-
ciency (which for given in- and output says that the allocation of the input
is eﬃcient) was also linear correlated to the RoA for all types of ownership.
For mutual and stock ﬁrms, we still ﬁnd a relatively high correlation be-
tween technical eﬃciency and the RoA, but not for public ﬁrms. We once
more observe that public ﬁrms work diﬀerently from private ﬁrms.
In the next paragraph, we focus on the determinants of eﬃciency at the
holding level. We run the same regression analysis for the results of technical
and cost eﬃciency on the holding level. Results are presented in table 17.
Our ﬁndings concerning explanatory variables for technical eﬃciency are
very similar to the estimations at the ﬁrm level. Diﬀerences can be found
in the signiﬁcance of market share and of the mutual dummy, both are not
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signiﬁcant at the holding level. Regarding cost eﬃciency, the results are very
similar, too.
Table 17: Tobit’s regression analysis on technical and cost eﬃciency
Independent Technical eﬃciency Cost eﬃciency
Variables coeﬃcient z-value coeﬃcient z-value
C 0.8480 50.156∗∗∗ 0.4966 32.257∗∗∗
Size −1.25E − 06 −1.176 −1.85E − 06 −2.605∗∗∗
Size2 2.63E − 11 2.795∗∗∗ 2.51E − 11 4.161∗∗∗
Can1 −0.0011 −3.155∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.687
Can2 −0.0081 −3.029∗∗∗ −0.0007 −0.323
Lev 0.0006 4.086∗∗∗ −0.0002 −2.176∗∗
Assets/Ins −0.3450 −6.304∗∗∗ −0.3497 −8.271∗∗∗
M 0.0340 2.635∗∗∗ −0.0097 0.877
P 0.1650 11.835∗∗∗ 0.3487 9.218∗∗∗
N 350 350
R2 0.2625 0.5539
adjusted R2 0.2340 0.5421
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level
Note:
** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
Summarizing our estimation results in this section, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
which show a high level of technical eﬃciency when measured against their
group-speciﬁc frontiers also oﬀer other features which seem to be favorable
for policyholders like, for instance, lower cancellation rates (which can be
considered a proxy for policyholder satisfaction). For cost eﬃciency, we ﬁnd
a high correlation with market share, which provides evidence for economies
of scale.
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9 Conclusion
In this thesis two agency hypotheses concerning diﬀerent forms of owner-
ship are tested: the eﬃcient structure hypothesis, which claims that ﬁrms
with a diﬀerent form of organizational structure operate on separate fron-
tiers and therefore use diﬀerent technologies to produce their group-speciﬁc
input/output combinations eﬃciently, and the expense preference hypothe-
sis, which claims that mutual and public ﬁrms are less cost-eﬃcient due to
weaker mechanisms for managerial control.
Using a data set of German life insurance companies accounting for more
than 90% of the total market share over the period 2002-2005, we found
evidence that stock, mutual and public insurers do not operate on a joint
production frontier and joint cost frontier. Although diﬀerent forms of owner-
ship use distinct technologies, the eﬃcient structure hypothesis, which states
that each group has a comparative advantage in producing its speciﬁc output
vectors, is rejected for mutual and public ﬁrms. Both forms of ownership are
not superior in producing their speciﬁc input/output combinations, but are
dominated by stock ownership.
Comparing companies by size, we also showed that the superiority of
stock insurers is present especially with smaller companies, which show a
higher degree of technical dominance over smaller mutual ﬁrms than larger
stock insurers over larger mutual ﬁrms. In terms of cost eﬃciency, our results
suggest that stock insurers as well as mutual insurers operate eﬃciently in
producing their speciﬁc outputs, while public companies do worst. Although
the latter is in line with the expense preference hypothesis, it is surprising
that mutual ﬁrms produce their speciﬁc outputs at least as eﬃciently as stock
insurers could do, even though pure stock insurers seem to represent the most
eﬃcient form of ownership. Moreover, our ﬁndings suggest that stock and
mutual companies allocate their resources eﬃciently, with limited evidence
for public ﬁrms.
Especially our ﬁndings regarding the lacking eﬃciency of public insurers
are in line with most parts of the theory on public ownership. As often ar-
gued, ﬁrms which operate ineﬃciently should be expelled from the market,
but this may not be true for public ﬁrms because of political interests. Since
eﬃciency is measured herein by a 4-inputs/2-outputs model, our ﬁndings
regarding public insurers may be limited. Public insurers in Germany arro-
gate other types of outputs and objectives which are certainly in contrast
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to “normal” proﬁt maximizing behavior, like, for example, playing an im-
portant role in local employment opportunities and in the promotion of arts,
sciences, sports and other social activities. These outputs are not comparable
to traditional outputs of proﬁt maximizing organizations and can hardly be
quantiﬁed, although these activities may contribute to societal and political
goals.
The traditional eﬃcient structure hypothesis seems to be unable to cap-
ture the hybrid form of public life insurers, which on the one hand have to
compete in the market with privately owned, proﬁt maximizing rivals, and on
the other hand are constrained by their public owners to non-core activities,
which might be judged as not eﬃciency enhancing. As a consequence, the
analysis of the social outputs of public ﬁrms and, therefore, the reconciliation
with the eﬃcient structure hypothesis is left to further research.
Furthermore, this thesis gives an insight into the importance of the own-
ership structure of the holding level. We observed that, in terms of eﬃciency,
ﬁrms with a stock holding dominate ﬁrms with a mutual or public holding.
We tested the potential inﬂuence of a holding company on the eﬃciency
of its diﬀerently organized subsidiary by splitting the sample of stock insur-
ers into subgroups based on the corporate structure of the respective holding
company. Our results suggest that hybrid forms (i.e. stock insurers owned by
a mutual or public holding company) are clearly inferior compared to pure
stock companies (i.e. stock insurers owned by a stock holding company) in
terms of technical and cost eﬃciency. Moreover, stock insurers owned by a
mutual holding show a signiﬁcantly higher degree of both technical and cost
eﬃciency than stock insurers owned by a public company. Generally speak-
ing, the advantage of pure stock insurers over hybrid forms and the advantage
of mutual stock insurers over public stock insurers is greater for smaller com-
panies. The lower degree of eﬃciency of hybrid forms leads to the conclusion
that the diﬀerence in organizational structures between an insurance com-
pany and its holding company may lead to frictions that cause ineﬃciencies.
These frictions do obviously not exist with a uniformly organized group of
companies.
Finally, we test the hypothesis that ﬁrms which are eﬃcient within their
speciﬁc group can be identiﬁed by some characteristics and key ﬁgures ob-
servable by stakeholders of the respective companies. We ran a regression
analysis and could observe that our results indicate that ﬁrms which show a
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high level of technical eﬃciency when measured against their group-speciﬁc
frontiers also oﬀer other features which seem to be favorable to policyholders
like, for instance, lower cancellation rates (which can be considered a proxy
for policyholder satisfaction).
54
Appendix A
The Malmquist Index
The Malmquist Index as described, for instance, in Caves, Christensen &
Diewert (1982) or in Fare, Grosskopf & Lovell (1994) reﬂects the eﬃciency
improvement from one time period to the next. It is deﬁned as:
M(xt+1, yt+1, xt, yt) =
√[T t(xt+1, yt+1)
T t(xt, yt)
× T
t+1(xt+1, yt+1)
T t+1(xt, yt)
]
,
with T t being the technical eﬃciency frontier as deﬁned above at time t,
and with xt and yt being the input and/or output vectors at time t. The
Malmquist Index is the geometrical mean of the eﬃciency of the data point
(xt, yt) under the technology of t + 1 and of the eﬃciency of (xt+1, yt+1)
under the technology of t. This is analogous to the X-eﬃciency, but instead
of measuring one technology on another production frontier, the technology
is measured on the frontier of the previous time period. A value greater than
one indicates an improvement in the technology and vice versa. In these last
estimations, we want to ﬁnd out whether the technology improvement for
ﬁrms with diﬀerent forms of ownership was/is noticeable over the observed
time period. The time period from 2002 to 2005 allows only three data points
for the Malmquist Index, which is insuﬃcient for general statements.
The data consist of 81 insurance companies for each year, thereof 60 stock,
17 mutual and 4 public insurers. The ownership with regard to the highest
ﬁrm level was 38 stock, 35 mutual and 8 public insurers.
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Table 18: Mean values of the Malmquist Index at the ﬁrm and the holding
level and t-test for diﬀerences in mean
Mean value t-test
All Mutual ﬁrms Stock ﬁrms Public ﬁrms M:S M:P S:P
2002/2003 1.094 1.077 1.075 1.423 ** **
2003/2004 0.982 0.983 0.992 0.918 * *
2004/2005 1.154 1.162 1.119 1.203
All Mutual holdings Stock holdings Public holdings M:S M:P S:P
2002/2003 1.094 1.119 1.047 1.205
2003/2004 0.982 0.987 0.983 0.952
2004/2005 1.154 1.136 1.150 1.256 *
Note:
*** signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level
** signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level, * signiﬁcant at the 0.1 level
The estimation results of the Malmquist Index show that the technical
eﬃciency of the overall German life insurance industry improved slightly in
2003 with a mean value of 1.094, decreased in 2004 (0.982) and improved in
2005 with an estimated mean value of 1.154. In 2002, the public insurers
improved most (1.423) with regard to the technology of the previous year.
They improved signiﬁcantly more than stock (1.077) and mutual (1.075)
insurers did. However, in 2004, technical eﬃciency of public ﬁrms changed
most strongly for the worse as compared to public and mutual ﬁrms. In
2005, an overall improvement, but no signiﬁcant diﬀerences corresponding
to the ownership could be observed. For the holding level, results are very
similar, but less signiﬁcant diﬀerences were found. The results of this thesis
show that the public insurers were acting less eﬃciently than mutual and
stock insurers. The estimations of the Malmquist Index could not prove that
the technology improvement of public insurers is less than with other forms
of ownership even if, as already mentioned, the time sample is too small to
show long-term developments. This would be interesting for further research
based on a longer time period.
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Appendix B
Bootstrapping Results
In Appendix B we present bootstrapping results for the technical eﬃciency.
Table 19: Mean values, mean values corrected by bootstrapping and conﬁ-
dence interval of technical eﬃciency scores for the reference set of all insurers
and for reference sets based on the organizational form of the companies
Technical eﬃciency: Mutual
sample means corrected means 95 conﬁdence interv.
Pooled 0.756 0.715 [0.685,0.750]
Individual subgroup 0.823 0.767 [0.716,0.818]
Technical eﬃciency: Public
sample means corrected means 95 conﬁdence interv.
Pooled 0.740 0.703 [0.672,0.734]
Individual subgroup 0.956 0.915 [0.853,0.955]
Technical eﬃciency: Stock
sample means corrected means 95 conﬁdence interv.
Pooled 0.784 0.730 [0.688,0.778]
Individual subgroup 0.801 0.745 [0.703,0.795]
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Table 20: Mean values, mean values corrected by bootstrapping and conﬁ-
dence interval of technical eﬃciency scores for the reference set of all insurers
and for reference sets based on the organizational form of the holding com-
pany
Technical eﬃciency: Mutual
sample means corrected means 95 conﬁdence interv.
Pooled 0.764 0.718 [0.683,0.757]
Individual subgroup 0.793 0.720 [0.662,0.786]
Technical eﬃciency: Public
sample means corrected means 95 conﬁdence interv.
Pooled 0.759 0.715 [0.679,0.752]
Individual subgroup 0.897 0.833 [0.762,0.893]
Technical eﬃciency: Stock
sample means corrected means 95 conﬁdence interv.
Pooled 0.793 0.736 [0.692,0.786]
Individual subgroup 0.821 0.747 [0.683,0.816]
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